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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Patrick Stell, Jr., appeals from his convictions for aggravated
assault, with a firearms enhancement, carrying a concealed weapon while under
the influence, malicious injury to property, and possession of paraphernalia.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Police investigated a report of a man with a gun in a park, who was
threatening someone in a car, and ultimately arrested Stell with a stolen handgun
and marijuana paraphernalia. (R., pp. 27-29.) Their investigation also showed
that the victim was Stell’s girlfriend and Stell had smashed her cell phone. (Id.)
The state charged Stell by information with assault with intent to commit
murder, with a firearm enhancement, and grand theft. (R., pp. 41-44.) The state
also charged Stell by citation with carrying a concealed weapon while under the
influence (R., p. 8), and malicious injury to property and possession of
paraphernalia (R., p. 16). After a trial on all the joined charges, the jury acquitted
Stell of the grand theft and assault with intent to commit murder charges, but
found Stell guilty of the included offense of aggravated assault and the charged
offenses of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, malicious injury to
property, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 212-13.) The jury also
found the firearm enhancement. (R., p. 214.) Stell timely appealed from the entry
of the judgments. (R., pp. 9 (judgment for carrying a concealed weapon under
the influence), 17 (judgment for malicious injury to property), 18 (judgment for
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possession of drug paraphernalia), 221-23 (judgment for aggravated assault
enhanced by firearm enhancement), 228-29 (notice of appeal).)

2

ISSUES
Stell states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err when it admitted an audio recording
of Mr. Stell’s arrest?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stell’s Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal for carrying a concealed
weapon when intoxicated?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Stell failed to show error in the district court’s ruling on his relevancy
and prejudice objections to State’s Exhibit 20?
2.
Has Stell failed to show fundamental error in the admission of the last part
of State’s Exhibit 20, in which he was provided his Miranda warnings?
3.
Has Stell failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion for
acquittal on the carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated charge?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Stell Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Ruling On His Relevancy
And Prejudice Objections To State’s Exhibit 20
A.

Introduction
State’s Exhibit 20 is a short portion of an audio recording of Stell’s

statements made at the time of his arrest, including his denial that anything
happened and denial that he had a girlfriend.

(State’s Exhibit 20.)

Stell

accurately states the exhibit was admitted “to show Mr. Stell was lying to the
police.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) According to Stell, however, evidence that he
lied to police about the crimes in question is “impermissible character evidence,”
inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(a). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Stell’s argument
fails for three reasons: it is not preserved, it is unsupported by any relevant
authority, and it lacks merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, the Court “reviews questions of admissibility of evidence using

a mixed standard of review.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d
217, 221 (2008). Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de
novo, but whether the evidence is subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 403 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Idaho’s appellate courts have “adopted
a three part test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion,”
which test requires the Court to consider whether the trial court (1) “correctly
perceived that the issue was one of discretion,” (2) “acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable
4

to the specific choices available to it,” and (3) “reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” Id. (citation omitted).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence
That Stell Lied To Officers About Events In Question
Stell’s appellate argument regarding I.R.E. 404(a) is not preserved. “For

an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for
the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be
apparent from the context.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956,
966 (2003) (citations omitted). Below, Stell objected that the recording was “not
relevant,” but the court accepted the state’s argument that it was relevant as an
“admission of a party opponent.” (11/4/15 Trial Tr., p. 132, L. 11 – p. 133, L. 1.)
Stell also argued it was unfairly prejudicial because it showed Stell “acting like an
ass.” (11/4/15 Trial Tr., p. 133, Ls. 2-7.) At no point did Stell claim the recording
was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(a) because it showed he lied to the police, nor
did the trial court rule on the admissibility of evidence under I.R.E. 404(a) that a
suspect lied to police. (11/4/15 Trial Tr., p. 132, L. 11 – p. 133, L. 17.) Stell has
failed to show on the record that his appellate argument—that evidence showing
he lied to police was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(a)—was preserved by
objection or ruling below.
Stell has also failed to cite relevant authority supporting his theory that
lying to the police about the facts of the crime is inadmissible character evidence.
“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or
argument, they will not be considered.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,
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923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Not only has Stell failed to support his theory with
authority, the authority he does cite is contrary to his argument. According to the
case he cites, “untruths in the statement given under interrogation” are
“incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word.”

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (cited and quoted at Appellant’s brief, p. 11). Because
evidence of untruths is incriminating, it is not “evidence of character” admitted
“for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith.”
I.R.E. 404(a). Stell’s theory that lying to the police or otherwise trying to mislead
or intimidate them about the facts of the crime at issue is inadmissible character
evidence is unsupported by any relevant law.
To the contrary, application of relevant law shows the evidence was
properly admitted.

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
I.R.E. 401.

Relevant evidence is generally admissible, unless otherwise

excluded by applicable rules. I.R.E. 402. Relevant evidence “may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
I.R.E. 403. “‘This rule, however, does not require the exclusion of all prejudicial
evidence, but only that which is unfairly prejudicial such that it tends to suggest a
decision on an improper basis.’” State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 309, 336 P.3d
232, 242 (2014) (quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179
(1998) (emphasis added)).

“The fact that [Stell’s] choice of words in his

statement were [sic] crude, vulgar and potentially offensive to a jury is not in and
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of itself sufficient reason to exclude [Stell’s] uncoerced statement to law
enforcement investigators.” State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905,
908 (Ct. App. 1994).
In the recording Stell falsely denied having a girlfriend, tried to mislead the
officer by claiming he did not hit her after the officer stated the crime at issue was
assault, tried to convince the officer there was no evidence to support his arrest,
and tried to intimidate the officer by threatening to get him fired. (State’s Exhibit
20.) All of this is relevant to Stell’s consciousness of guilt and is “incriminating in
any meaningful sense of the word.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. Moreover, that
Stell demonstrated his consciousness of guilt “like an ass” (11/4/15 Trial Tr.,
p. 133, Ls. 2-7) did not render the evidence inadmissible. Floyd, 125 Idaho at
654, 873 P.2d at 908. Application of the relevant legal standards shows no error
by the district court.
Finally, Stell asserts that the district court failed to apply the relevant legal
standard, and therefore abused its discretion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) The
entirety of the district court’s ruling on the objection at trial, made before the jury,
was, “I’m going to allow it.” (11/4/15 Trial Tr., p. 133, L. 8.) Stell has failed, on
this record, to show that the district court employed an incorrect legal standard.
In making his argument that the district court failed to apply Rule 403’s
balancing test Stell relies on State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 334 P.3d 806
(2014). In Parker, the district court specifically stated that the balancing test of
Rule 403 “is not an issue here” because it had already ruled that the evidence
objected to (the detective’s statements in an interview) was not evidence, but
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was submitted to the jury only to provide context. Id. at 138, 334 P.3d at 812.
Rejecting the theory that evidence of context not admitted for the truth of the
matter asserted was not evidence, the Court held that failure to apply the
balancing test to a Rule 403 objection was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 139,
334 P.3d at 813. In contrast to Parker, in this case the district court did not
refuse to apply the balancing test of Rule 403. Rather, it merely overruled Stell’s
Rule 403 objection that the exhibit was inadmissible because he was at the time
acting like an “ass.”
Stell’s argument confuses the error of refusing to apply the correct legal
standard found in Parker (or the application of standards other than the balancing
test required by Rule 403, as determined in the cases cited in that opinion1) with
not putting the analysis on the record. Because, unlike in Parker, nothing in the
record suggests the district court employed an incorrect legal standard, Stell has
failed to show error.
Even if not articulating its analysis on the record could be considered
erroneous, the error was harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d
961, 974 (2010) (error will be declared harmless if state demonstrates

The Court cited to and relied on other cases where the district court employed
legal standards other than the balancing test required by I.R.E. 403. In State v.
Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d 720 (2010), the district court excluded all
evidence of the mandatory minimum sentence potentially avoided by a state’s
witness rather than balancing potential unfair prejudice. Parker, 157 Idaho at
139, 334 P.3d at 813. In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009),
the district court employed a standard from a case pre-dating the adoption of
Rule 403 rather than the balancing standard of Rule 403. Parker, 157 Idaho at
139, 334 P.3d at 813. In short, in all three cases, Parker, Ruiz and Meister, the
record established that the district court employed a standard other than the
balancing test of Rule 403.
1
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harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt). First, as set forth above, there is
ample authority that admission of evidence of Stell’s statements at the time of his
arrest was within the bounds of the district court’s discretion. Failure to articulate
those grounds was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for this reason.
Second, Stell suffered no unfair prejudice. The evidence shows he pointed a gun
at the victim during an argument. (11/04/15 Tr., p. 87, L. 24 – p. 93, L. 21;
11/5/15 Trial Tr., p. 285, L. 10 – p. 288, L. 16; p. 290, L. 1 – p. 292, L. 13; p. 327,
L. 24 – p. 336, L. 13; p. 340, L. 6 – p. 348, L. 2; p. 371, L. 2 – p. 374, L. 5; p. 377,
Ls. 21-25; p. 378, Ls. 7-16; p. 386, L. 2 – p. 387, L. 9.) The jury convicted him of
some charges but not others, and of the reduced offense of aggravated assault
(as opposed to the charged offense of assault with intent to commit murder).
(R., pp. 212-14.) This shows that its verdict was based on the evidence rather
than on any minimal potential unfair prejudice caused by the court’s alleged
failure to put its analysis on the record (or, for that matter, the potential unfair
prejudice of Stell acting like an “ass” when arrested). Any error in the district
court not putting its Rule 403 analysis on the record, or any error in the
admission of the evidence, was harmless.
II.
Stell Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Admission Of The Last Part
Of State’s Exhibit 20, In Which He Was Provided His Miranda Warnings
A.

Introduction
Stell asserts, for the first time on appeal, that Exhibit 20 should have been

redacted before admission because he invoked his right to counsel while being
given the Miranda warnings. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-16.) Stell has failed to
9

show a clear due process violation or prejudice from the admission of the
evidence.
B.

Standard Of Review
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Claims of
error not preserved by timely objection are reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
C.

Stell Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error For Not Redacting The
Last Portion Of State’s Exhibit 20
Stell has failed to show a clear due process violation in the record.

“[I]mpeachment use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence” violates due process
because “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to
allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial.”

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1976).

“‘[W]e have consistently explained Doyle as a case where the government had
induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be
used against him.’”

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 74 (2000) (brackets
10

original (quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982) (per curiam)). “With
respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not
mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as
well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.”
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 n. 13 (1986).
The record in this case does not show a clear Doyle violation for two
reasons. First, it is not clear on the record that Stell’s statement of desire to have
a lawyer would have been interpreted by the jury as a “desire to remain silent
until an attorney has been consulted.” Id. at 295 n. 13. In fact, just after the
invocation of the right to counsel, and the officer’s question whether Stell wanted
to tell him what happened quoted by Stell on appeal (Appellant’s brief, p. 14),
Stell said, “I told you what happened. Nothing happened. … Nothing happened,
Sir, I never did that.” (State’s Exhibit 20, at 3:34 – 3:38.) It is not clear factually
that the invocation of the right to counsel was also an invocation of the right to
silence protected by Doyle because Stell gave a statement regarding the facts of
the crime before receiving warnings and expressly relied on that prior statement
after receiving warnings. Although the record is clear that Stell expressed a
desire for counsel, such is a due process violation under the law only if it is also a
concurrent invocation of the right to silence. The record does not make clear that
Stell’s invocation of the right to counsel was also an invocation of the right to
silence because at no point did Stell actually invoke that right, nor was he silent
at any point in the exhibit.
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Stell argues that the presentation of evidence that he invoked his right to
counsel is itself a due process violation. (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) The cases he
cites for that proposition do not contradict the statement in Wainright, supra, that
there is a due process violation only to the extent the invocation of the right to
counsel is also an invocation of the right to silence.

In Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609, 610-11 (1965) (cited at Appellant’s brief, p. 15), the prosecutor, in
closing argument, asked the jury to draw an inference of guilt from the
defendant’s choice to not testify.

In State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 147,

334 P.3d 806, 821 (2014) (cited at Appellant’s brief, p. 15), the prosecution
presented evidence that the defendant terminated a police interview by invoking
his right to silence. In State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59-60, 253 P.3d 727,
733-34 (2011) (cited at Appellant’s brief, p. 15), the Court held it was misconduct
to elicit testimony that the officer “attempted” to interview defendant after his
arrest when the interview attempt was thwarted by the invocation of the right to
silence, and in State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 298, 62 P.3d 644, 646 (Ct. App.
2003) (cited at Appellant’s brief, p. 15), the error was the testifying officer’s
volunteered testimony that the defendant refused to say anything after being
given Miranda warnings. In State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 711-14, 992 P.2d
158, 160-63 (1999), and State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 577-78, 114 P.3d 133,
136-37 (Ct. App. 2005) (cited at Appellant’s brief, p. 15), the prosecutor
improperly impeached the defendants’ trial testimony with evidence they had
invoked their post-Miranda right to silence. None of the cases cited by Stell hold
that admission of evidence of the invocation of counsel without more results in a
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due process violation. Thus, he has failed to show that the error he claims is
clear constitutional error as required to demonstrate fundamental error.
Second, even if the right to silence had been clearly invoked, such
invocation was never used in any effort to impeach Stell. “[T]he holding of Doyle
is that the Due Process Clause bars the use for impeachment purposes of a
defendant’s postarrest silence.”
(emphasis original).

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987)

Although the jury was made aware of the invocation of

counsel by Stell, no post-Miranda silence was used by the state to imply guilt.
The jury was certainly aware that Stell had invoked his right to counsel—he was
represented by an attorney at trial—so the fact that Stell invoked that right early
rather than late did not in any way impeach him.
In addition, the error is not clear in the record because the lack of
objection could easily have been the result of tactical choice. Stell’s counsel very
easily may have chosen to let the exhibit play out to the end because of Stell’s
statements immediately after receiving his Miranda rights: “I told you what
happened. Nothing happened. … Nothing happened, Sir, I never did that.”
(State’s Exhibit 20, at 3:34 – 3:38.) If counsel had asked to end the recording
before those statements he may have found the prosecutor entirely
accommodating. In short, on this record counsel may have chosen to object to
the entire exhibit as he expressed on the record, but declined to object to the last
portion of it for entirely tactical reasons.
Finally, Stell has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As noted above, not
only did Exhibit 20 not include any invocation of the right to silence, it in fact
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included Stell’s general denials of guilt. Stell argues that invocation of the right to
counsel “signals a guilty conscious [sic].” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) The state
notes, however, that although an instruction that the jury take no inference of
guilt from the defendant’s invocation of the right to silence at trial is common, ICJI
301; Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), no equivalent instruction that
jurors take no adverse inference from the invocation of the right to counsel is
generally required merely because a defendant is represented by counsel at the
trial. That a jury might draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s refusal to
provide his “side of the story” seems obvious, but that a jury would draw an
adverse inference from a defendant’s desire to be represented by an attorney
after his arrest seems far less obvious. Stell has failed to show a probability that
the jury concluded that Stell had invoked his right to silence, much less that the
jury concluded that such invocation of the right to silence was an admission of
guilt under the facts of this case.
Moreover, as noted above, the record strongly suggests that the jury
decided this case on the basis of the evidence, and not on the basis of unfair
prejudice. Stell’s fundamental error argument fails on all three elements.
III.
Stell Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For
Acquittal On The Carrying A Concealed Weapon While Intoxicated Charge
A.

Introduction
Stell moved at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for an

acquittal on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon while under the
influence. (11/06/15 Trial Tr., p. 19, Ls. 4-14.) In response, the prosecutor
14

outlined the evidence supporting the charge. (11/06/15 Trial Tr., p. 20, L. 18 –
p. 21, L. 25.) The district court denied the motion, concluding there was “enough
evidence to send to the jury.” (11/06/15 Trial Tr., p. 23, L. 25 – p. 24, L. 1.)
On appeal Stell concedes there was sufficient evidence he carried a
concealed weapon, and admits there was evidence that he had been drinking,
but disputes whether the evidence shows he was intoxicated or under the
influence.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-23.) Review of the evidence, under the

applicable standard, shows the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.” State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. A. 1997); State v. Reyes,
121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding
the jury’s verdict.

Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart,

112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).
15

The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Thompson,

140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
C.

The Evidence Was Sufficient To Show Stell Was Under The Influence Of
An Intoxicating Drink Or Drug
“It shall be unlawful for any person to carry a concealed weapon on or

about his person when intoxicated or under the influence of an intoxicating drink
or drug.” I.C. § 19-3302B(1). The state agrees with Stell’s dictionary definitions
of “intoxicated” as a “‘diminished ability to act with full mental and physical
capabilities’” and “under the influence” as “‘deprived of clearness of mind and
self-control.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 18 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10 th Ed.
2014)).) The issue before this Court, then, is whether the trial record shows
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found Stell had
a diminished ability to act with full mental and physical capabilities or was
deprived of clearness of mind and self-control as a result of alcohol or drugs.
The evidence supports both the conclusion that Stell acted without clearness of
mind and self-control, and that such lack of clearness and self-control was a
result of his alcohol consumption.
Arlan Scroggins, a friend of Stell’s who was with him immediately before
and after the aggravated assault, testified that he “could tell” by Stell’s behavior
that Stell had been drinking, but “couldn’t tell that he had been drinking drinking.”
(11/05/15 Trial Tr., p. 328, Ls. 10-15.) Scroggins was then asked if he thought
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Stell “had some alcohol based on how he was behaving” and Scroggins
answered, “A little bit probably.” (11/05/15 Trial Tr., p. 328, Ls. 16-18.)
Stell’s behavior, in addition to that which led Scroggins to conclude Stell
had been drinking (even if not “drinking drinking”), included that he threatened his
girlfriend (and mother of his child) with a gun (11/04/15 Trial Tr., p. 89, L. 1 –
p. 93, L. 21; State’s Exhibit 1); tried to crawl out a bathroom window to avoid
police (11/04/15 Trial Tr., p.123, L. 8 – p. 124, L. 9; p. 153, L. 7 – p. 155, L. 14);
begged the police to shoot him (11/04/15 Trial Tr., p. 124, Ls. 10-18; p. 155,
L. 15 – p. 156, L. 4); called them “punks” or “bitches” when they refused to shoot
him (11/04/15 Trial Tr., p. 156, Ls. 3-7); and threatened to get the officer who
arrested him fired (State’s Exhibit 20; see also 11/04/15 Trial Tr., p. 133, Ls. 2-7
(defense counsel admitting Stell was acting “like an ass”)). It is thus beyond cavil
that (1) Stell had been drinking and (2) that he acted without clearness of mind
and self-control. It was not unreasonable for the jury to connect those two dots
and conclude the latter was a product of the former. The evidence was sufficient
to show Stell was intoxicated or under the influence.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments of
conviction.
DATED this 30th day of March, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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